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I. INTRODUCTION
Technological advances are expanding the medium and increasing the
speed of communication. Society is adapting and so must the law. The
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) reflects these changes in many aspects,
* B.A., Indiana University, 1997; candidate for J.D., Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington, 2000. Ms. Weiner would like to thank her friends and family,
especially her mother, Kristina, and her father, Lowell, for their continuing enthusiasm,
love, and support.
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including a section decreasing the time periods that banks are allowed to
dishonor checks.' In the United States, Congress has enacted new laws that
protect privacy of information in order to control the information that
passes in the growing commercial market. 2 E-mail is now admissible as
proof for employment discrimination' and defamation4 cases. Congress
adapted copyright laws to include information exchanged via e-mail and
the Internet.5 It only seems natural that labor law will acclimate to
cyberspace along with the rest of society.
The effects of cyberspace in labor law are the most prevalent with
union organizing activity. The use of an employer's e-mail system is a new,
unique, and efficient tool that could enable labor organizers to reach a
larger number of employees in a shorter amount of time. With the use of email and a list of e-mall addresses, a union officer could contact thousands
of employees with one letter in a matter of seconds. Strikes could be
announced at a moment's notice. Meetings could be scheduled,
rescheduled, or even occur over e-mail. The organizers no longer have to
leave their own offices to reach the workers. Access to employer e-mail
systems would lift a boundary-that is, if the employees are granted use of
the employer's e-mail system for protected concerted organizing activity.
The employees have a major hurdle before they can freely use
company e-mal-it is the employer's e-mail system. The employer pays
for the computers, programs, technical support staff, and the employee's
time while the employee uses the system. So, in conjunction with
organizing power, cyberspace extends the boundaries of employer property
rights. Although it is crucial to allow employees the ability to organize,
employer rights may not be unreasonably infringed. There must be a
balance of employer's property right interests with the employee's rights to
organize.
Where does the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) fall on the
issue of whether e-mail is the employer's tool or the employee's tool? The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has not had the
opportunity to decide this issue. Hence, employers and employees are left
wondering what uses of e-mail are permissible in the labor context. This is
a very prevalent concern. Not only is e-mail becoming a common tool in
the workplace, but it is also a very common tool in the organizing context.

1. See U.C.C. §§ 4-301, 4-302 (midnight deadline rules).
2. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Strauss v. Microsoft, Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
4. See, e.g., Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 730 A.2d 854 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999).
5. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line [sic] Comm. Servs., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

Number 3] EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER RIGHTS IN E-MAIL

There are Web sites covering the Internet that link viewers to union
6
literature, union official applications, and a list of union Web pages.
This Note focuses on the next step the NLRB must take to bring labor
law up to speed with technology. With guidance from the NLRA and
previous NLRB and court decisions, this Note demonstrates that employer
property interests in e-mail systems may not be ignored when dealing with
e-mail in the labor organizing context. Due to the fact that the NLRB
consistently has ruled that forms of employee written communication,
labeled "distribution"
in the
organizing context, may be
nondiscriminatorily limited with a showing of legitimate business interests,
employees' personal use of company e-mail systems may be prohibited.
This is not a pro-employer or pro-employee position, just an efficient and
effective solution. Both the employer and employee must sacrifice with a
business-only e-mail policy but less rights overall will be infringed.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the issues that arise when unions and employees have
unlimited access to employer e-mail systems, it is important to grasp the
purpose and substance of the NLRA. The NLRA's dominant purpose is to
foster the "right of employees to organize for mutual aid without employer
interference." 7 This purpose is achieved through setting out the rights of
employees and consequences for those who do not follow the NLRA. The
pertinent sections of the NLRA, when dealing with rights to employer
provided mediums of communication, are (1) 29 U.S.C. § 157, which sets
out employee rights:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this
title[;]"
(2) 29 U.S.C § 158(a)(1), which states "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
6. See, e.g., Geo <cites> (visited Mar. 19, 2000) <http://www.geocites.com/
WallStreet/3088/labor.htm>;
UAW,
Why
UAW
(visited
Jan.
26,
2000)

<http:/uaw.orglfaqs/faqs.html>; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Organize Your
Future (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http://www.teamster.orglorganizingwhy.html>; AFL-CIO,
OrganizingInstitute (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http://www.aflcio.orglorginsttindex.htm>.
7. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).

8. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
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exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title"; 9 and (3) 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), which explains "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization .... 10The NLRB then applies the
NLRA general language according to specific facts, which allows a certain
amount of flexibility within the statutory limitations. If the NLRB decides
that the employer's practice does constitute an unfair labor practice, it
institutes remedies such as back pay, reinstatement of work for discharged
employees, and rescission of the unlawful rule."1
An employee's use of an employer's e-mail system comes under issue
in the NLRA because, due to the nature of e-mail and cyberspace generally,
it is not clear exactly whether communicating over e-mail is considered a
protected "concerted activity." A concerted activity includes both
traditional union organizing efforts but also any worker activity that is "in
some way... in concert with the efforts of at least one other worker or...
based on a right provided by a collectively bargained agreement."' 2 In the
past, the Board considered union organizing communication a protected
concerted activity based on a distinction of whether the union
communication is considered solicitation or distribution. However, the
NLRB has not decided which category e-mail fits and is therefore a pivotal
issue. If the Board decides that cyberspace belongs to the employees, the
Board allows union organizing efforts to trump employer rights in
company e-mail systems, and employer interests are completely ignored.
Therefore, the NLRB must decide that e-mail is distribution under the labor
standards, and as a result the employer may have a business-only policy for
company e-mail systems.
III. SoLICITATION VS. DISTRIBUTION: APPLICATION TO
CYBERSPACE
Solicitation "normally involves oral communications between
workers regarding organizing.' ' 13 This form of communication is especially
protected due the nature of face-to-face communication. Hence, "a rule
against solicitation is invalid as to union solicitation on the employer's
9. Id. § 158(a)(1) (1994).

10. Id. § 158(a)(3).
11. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. 793 (example of the Board awarding
back pay, reinstatement of jobs, and rescission of the employer's no-solicitation rule).
12. ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 168
(1996) (footnote omitted).
13. Daniel V. Yager & Thomas S. Threlkeld, Workplace Cyber-Space--Going Where
No BoardHas Gone Before, at 9 (visited Sept. 11, 1999) <http://www.nlrbwatch.com>.
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premises during employee's own time" and is therefore a section 8(a)(3)
violation.14 The principal behind this presumption is to stop the employer
from controlling union activity by denying access to company property. An
example of the NLRB ruling that a nondiscriminatory, no-solicitation rule
is invalid is Republic Aviation Corp.,5 where an employee was wearing a
union steward button while passing out union cards on employer's property
during nonworking hours. 6 The employer discharged the employee due to
a no-solicitation rule prohibiting any and all solicitation in the plant." Even
though the employer did not apply the rule in a manner as to discriminate
solely against union supporters, the Board still ruled that this was an
"unreasonable impediment to self-organization" and was unlawful given
the absence of special circumstances. 8
If the court considers that organizing activity is solicitation, there are
still some limits. The employer can enforce a rule prohibiting union
solicitation during working hours as long as the rule is not adopted for the
purpose of discrimination against union activity.1 9 After all, "[w]orking
time is for work," 20 and the employer's work-time productivity is not
expected to suffer because employees are not fulfilling their job
responsibilities due to union organizing activity. Basically, the NLRB will
permit a no-solicitation rule if limited to working time and not targeted at
union-related activity.
Distribution, on the other hand, "[normally] involves the circulation
of written union literature by [an] employee. ' 2' An employer has more
rights when employee communication falls into this category because, due
to the nature of the communication, it can be handed out but read at another
time. There is, however, a distinction between nonemployee and employee
distribution of union literature.
Nonemployee distribution is not as difficult for the employer to
prohibit.
[The] employer may validly post his property against nonemployee
distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication will enable it to
reach the employees with its message and if the employers' notice or

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 805.
Id.
See id. at 795.
See id.
Republic Aviation, 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187 (1943).
See Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943).
Id.
Yager & Threlkeld, supra note 13, at 9.
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order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other
distribution. 22
Due to the fact that "[oIrganization rights are granted to workers by the
same authority"-the federal government, which preserves property rights
of the employers-accommodation "between the two must be obtained
with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other.' ' 3 An example of this concept is NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,'

where nonemployee union organizers distributed union literature in
employer parking lots. The Board looked to the location of the plant and
living quarters of the employees and decided that since the employee had
available other usual methods to get the message out that the employees
were not "beyond reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with
them."5 Therefore, the employer validly prohibited the nonemployer
organizers from its parking lots.
Employee distribution is more of an obstacle for the employer than
nonemployee distribution because "no restriction may be placed on the
employees' rights to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless
the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain
production or discipline." 26 A good example of this policy is in StoddardQuirk Manufacturing Co.,27 where the employer discharged an employee
for distributing literature in company parking lots in violation of the
employer's rule prohibiting unauthorized distribution of literature on
company premises. The Board examined the employer's concerns, such as
littering of the premises (which is a legitimate concern), but held thatbased on the employee's interest in distributing the literature and the nature
of distribution-nonwork areas must be made available for distribution
28
regardless of other available methods of communication.
As a result of the differences between solicitation and distribution,
NLRB decisions on the matter of whether e-mail is distribution or
solicitation are fact sensitive. Although most decisions rely on the
oral/written distinction, the Board must look to the circumstances
surrounding the communication before deciding the limits an employer
may place upon its employees. Therefore, it is within the Board's discretion
as to how the solicitation/distribution distinction will be applied in order to
comply with the purposes of the NLRA.
22. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 113.
26. Id. at 113.
27. 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).

28. See id.
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Only one case discusses the use of the employer's e-mail system with
labor organization, E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co29 In this case, the Board
found it unlawful for a company to ban distribution of union literature over
e-mail when the company allowed other nonwork related e-mails under the
policy.30 The Board was not too helpful here because basically it reaffirmed
that a medium of communication cannot be restricted discriminatorily
against union activity. The case did not address nondiscriminatory, nodistribution policies nor did it discuss the conflict of e-mail as solicitation
or distribution. Thus, the Board's decision does not give the unions or
employers much to rely upon when making policies or using employer email property.
Employers and employees are left with the Report of the General
31 The Report discusses "whether an [e]mployer's
Counsel (Report).
prohibition of all non-business [sic] use of electronic mail ... including
employees' messages protected by [s]ection 7 of the [NLRA], was
overbroad and facially unlawful. 32 The Report specifically addresses the
issue of solicitation versus distribution.
The General Counsel adheres to the original principles of distribution
and solicitation rules in the labor context and concludes that the distinction
between solicitation and distribution "must be defined based on the nature
of the employees' interests and purposes in addition to interest of the
employer. '3 3 Standards also state that:
Where the communication can reasonably be expected to occasion a
spontaneous response or initiate reciprocal conversation, it is
solicitation; where the communication is one-sided and the purpose of
the communication is achieved so long as it is received, it is
distribution. 34
The Report concludes that employee e-mail regarding protected concerted
activity is solicitation in some cases.35 In those where the e-mail meets the
definition of distribution, the General Counsel admits that because
distributed literature may be put down and read or reread later, the Board
weighs employer interests more heavily with distribution. The Report also
29. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993) (stating that
nonwork related e-mails were materials that had "little or no relevance to the Company's
business").

30. See id. at 920.
31. See Fred Feinstein, NLRB Acting General Counsel Fred Feinstein's Report on
Cases Decided from March 31, 1996 to June 30, 1998, 172 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-4
(Sept. 4, 1998). This is the Report of the General Counsel.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. See id.
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states that sent messages could be a disruption or affect production through
littering of cyberspace. But since a blanket, nonbusiness purpose e-mail
prohibition policy would curtail the solicitation messages as well, such a
36
policy is overbroad and facially unlawful.
Although the Report addresses the solicitation/distribution issue head
on, it does not leave the Board with much relief in its decision due to the
evidentiary holes in the Report. The General Counsel interprets e-mail to
be solicitation in some instances and supports this finding by citing to
authorities that do not analyze e-mail from a labor perspective but from the
perspective of judges communicating during court and agencies discussing
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.37 The NLRB is a
separate administrative body that deals solely with labor issues. Thus, the
Board is the authority as to whether under the NLRA business-only e-mail
policies are unlawful, not courts nor house reports dealing with e-mail in
other areas. Hence, although the Board may take into consideration other
views, the NLRB ultimately must decide how to view e-mail from a labor
perspective in order to make labor organizing a less complicated activity.
In the past, the NLRB has dealt with legal issues differently due to the
labor consequences. For example, in the property rights context, the NLRB
ruled that employees do have certain rights in equipment in which the
employer clearly has complete ownership rights. 8 The Board is able to
restrict an employer from using its own bulletin board to announce a local
nonbusiness purpose meeting if the employer does not give the employee
rights in the bulletin board to announce a union meeting.39 Other areas of
the law do not tolerate this type of a restriction on property rights. It would
be an outrage if courts requireda private home owner, once he puts a sign
in his lawn advertising a candidate, to permit other candidates with
platforms adverse to the home owner's interests to advertise on the owner's
lawn as well. Nonetheless, the NLRB controls the private employer's
property this way. The NLRB also curbs free speech in the labor context
under section 8(c) of the NLRA. 4 Although employer and employee free
36. See id.

37. See id. at E-5 (citations omitted). "E-mail transmissions are quickly becoming a
substitute for telephonic and printed communications, as well as a substitute for direct oral
communications." "E-mail 'is interactive in nature and can involve virtually instantaneous
'conversations' more like a telephone call than mail."'
38. See, e.g., Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1995).
39. See id.

40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994) (stating that "[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form,
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit").
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speech is still protected under the Act, if an employer threatens reprisal or
force or promises benefits if employees vote a certain way in union
elections, then the employer committed an unfair labor practice.4' Clearly,
the Board is able to interpret everyday activities and rights differently for
the labor context, and, therefore, decision-making bodies, other than the
NLRB, have only a persuasive effect on labor decisions.
Another problem with the General Counsel's opinion is, if followed,
it would bog down the Board with litigation over whether a specific e-mail
had the qualities of a conversation or writing. In order for the Board to
achieve the purpose of the NLRA, it must establish strict rules so that
employers and employees are not left wondering if organizing e-mails are
"'oral" or "written" and therefore illegal to prohibit or not.
The Report at least recognizes that there are still unresolved issues:
(1) "whether there is an [e]-mail equivalent to 'distribution;"' (2) "what the
precise definition of 'working time' is for employees who work on
computers at flexible times and places;" and (3) "whether there could be
reasonable rules limiting the use of [e]-mail in order to narrowly address
particular problems. 42 As a result of the discrepancies in the Report and
the issues that have not been addressed, employers must particularly watch
their e-mail policies. An Oregon Employment Law Letter warns employers
to at least make sure that enforcement of e-mail policies is "uniform and
consistent." 4 Since the Board has made no decision as to whether
organizing over e-mail constitutes solicitation or distribution, the
employers are left with only vague advisory articles. 44
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH E-MAIL AS SOLICITATION
If the Board decides that e-mail is solicitation, and therefore may be
used for union activities during nonworking times in working and
nonworking areas, numerous problems will ensue. Although such a
decision would resolve the solicitation/distribution issue, it would raise
many more issues equally troublesome. As a result, the NLRB decision
would not promote the purpose of the NLRA-to facilitate protected
concerted activities related to employee organization-but cause immense
litigation and confusion.
First, facilitating the no-work-time e-mail rule would cause
significant monitoring issues. The employer would not know whether
41. See GOLDMAN, supra note 12, at 169-171.
42. Feinstein, supra note 31.
43. Perkins Cole, Business-only E-mail Policy Under Attack by NLRB, 5 No. 10 Or.
Employment L. Letter 3 (June 1999).

44. See id.
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employee is abusing the system unless it monitored the employee's e-mail.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 19864' addresses the issue
of monitoring e-mails in the private workplace and prohibits interception of
electronic communications both during the transmission and from
electronic storage. There are some
exceptions that the employer clearly fits
• • 46
into which allow such monitoring, but this just opens up more areas for
confusion and litigation.
In addition to the problems of complying with monitoring statutes, the
employer would face more problems with the NLRA. The employer
monitoring may be viewed as surveillance of employee activity, which is a
section 8(a)(1) violation when it interferes with employee section 7 rights.
Previously, the Board has ruled against the employer monitoring. For
example, when a company security officer questioned employees about
their union activities, the court ruled that this monitoring implied intrusive
and illegal surveillance under the NLRA. 47 The Board also ruled that an
employer engaged in illegal surveillance when the employer had union
agents followed as the agent talked to the employees. 48 Clearly, the
employer delves into a complicated and risky area when it monitors its
employees. Again, there are no cases to support whether or not monitoring
e-mail is illegal surveillance. Many of the past cases occurred in response
to monitoring violence during such activities as picketing. 49 E-mail in the
labor organizing setting is a new issue, and the Board may decide to extend
its surveillance limits to prohibit e-mail observation as well. Further
supporting this possibility is the fact that the Board primarily allows
surveillance of protected concerted activities in cases when an employer
has a "reasonable,
objective justification" for surveillance, such as security
50
reasons. It is not a security interest but a property interest that the
employer would be protecting if the employer monitored employee e-mails
for illegal union activity. E-mail surveillance would become yet another
litigation magnet.
Surveillance is especially an issue with e-mail because e-mail and
Internet use cannot be easily monitored without much intrusion. Normally,
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
46. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(5)(a) (ordinary course of business exception),
2701(c)(1) (storage access exception), 2511(2)(d), 2701, 2702(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998)
(consent exception). Due to the labor perspective and concentration on the NLRA taken in
this Note, these provisions are not explored further.
47. See NLRB v. Security Plating Co., 356 F.2d 725,728 (9th Cir. 1966).
48. See West Lawrence Care Ctr. Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1101, 1101 (1992).
49. See, e.g., NLRB v. Colonial Haven Nursing Home, Inc., 542 F.2d 691, 699 (7th Cir.
1976); Waco, 273 N.L.R.B. 746 (1984).
50. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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the employer could just walk around the company's premises to see if there
is a misuse of employer's property. It is easy to tell if an employee is
announcing a union meeting during work hours just by standing in the
work area. With e-mail, an employer must buy and install monitoring
programs and employ and train staff to perform the monitoring. This list of
negative consequences resulting from a Board ruling that e-mail is
solicitation in the labor context is not exhaustive.
Even if employees complied with the solicitation limits on e-mail use
and only sent e-mail during nonworking time, an employee could not
control when e-mail is received. It would be unfair for the employer to hold
the employee responsible for receiving messages during work hours. At the
same time, it would be expensive and intrusive for the employer to set up a
monitoring system that sifts through e-mails to determine whether the
subject is personal (such as union related) or business related and then only
permit the business-related e-mails to be transmitted to the individual
employee accounts. This problem is complicated by employees with
flexible work schedules. As the General Counsel points out in the Report,
working time is difficult to define when employees are able to work from
home or at different periods during the day. The employer would never
know in the flexible work time situation when it is illegal for an employer
to curtail union organizational communication.
Assuming that the employees diligently monitored their e-mail and
did not open any union-related e-mail during working time, problems
would still occur. In many systems, a message appears on the screen
indicating who sent the e-mail and the subject of the message. It would be
alarming and disruptive for a subject line to comment across the screen
with "STRIKE!" These subject lines could cause chaos in the workplace.
Ultimately, if the Board decides that e-mail is solicitation, it would not only
open up the floodgates for litigation but also hurt organizing efforts.
V. THE FUTURE: E-MAIL Is DISTRIBUTION
E-mail fits soundly into the category of distribution. Beginning with
the obvious, e-mail is communication through writing. Although there are
some exceptions to the written/oral distinction, it is a good basis for the
analysis as to whether e-mail is solicitation or distribution. As the General
Counsel points out, there are other factors that come into play when a
determination must be made as to which category employee
communications fits.
51. See Feinstein, supra note 31.
52. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (holding that
wearing union steward buttons is a form of solicitation).
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The General Counsel's Report formulates a test of sorts as noted
above.53 Using the Report's analysis it is clear that e-mail is distribution
because it fits the attributes set forth for distribution and does not comply
with the solicitation characteristics. Communication over e-mail is clearly
one-sided with the purpose to reach the reader, similar to a letter. E-mails
may be saved for reading or rereading at another time.5" Furthermore, there
is no person standing by the recipient of e-mail waiting for an immediate
response or action as is true with solicitation. Ironically, even the General
Counsel's criteria prove e-mail communications to be distribution.
As a matter of fact, it would shock most to hear that e-mail is the
same as speaking to someone. A reader cannot hear the inflection in a
person's voice through e-mail nor can the subtleties of speech such as
concern, fear, sympathy, or sarcasm be detected. What is originally drafted
as a joke, without the actual voice of the writer communicating the words,
might come across as a personally offensive commentary over e-mail.
Obviously, e-mail does not have the same qualities as oral communication.
While some may point to the speed in which information over e-mail may
be transferred, time lapse alone is not enough to determine that e-mail is
like communicating face-to-face. E-mail soundly fits into the category of
distribution and adheres with standards set by the courts, the General
Counsel Report, and common sense.
VI. BusINEss-oNLY E-MAIL POLICY
Since e-mail is distribution, employers may limit its use through a
business-only e-mail policy. The Board allows these blanket policies with
most other mediums of communication as long as the policy does not
discriminate against the union. The NLRA "does not command that labor
organizations ... are entitled to use a medium [of communication in the
workplace] simply because the employer is using it."'55 The Board does not
overlook the employers' property rights in their physical property and their
businesses. The Board has decided many limiting use cases in favor of the
employer.

53. See infra Part I (determining "[w]here communication can reasonably be expected
to occasion a spontaneous response or initiate reciprocal conversation, it is solicitation;
where the communication is one-sided and the purpose of the communication is achieved so
long as it is received, it is distribution.").
54. See Mark A. Spongnardi & Ruth Hill Bro, Organizing Through Cyberspace:
Electronic Communications and the National Labor RelationsAct, 23 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
141, 147 (1998) (supporting that most view e-mail as a form of written communication).
55. Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing NLRB v.
Steelworkers Union, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958)).
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For example, in Union Carbide Corp.,56 the Board decided that the
employer's business-only policy is valid as it relates to the use of the
telephone as long as the employer does not grant employees the privilege to
use the telephones during work time for personal reasons.7 Guardian
Industries Corp. is another example of a valid business-only policy. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer can restrict the use
of a bulletin board from union organizing activities even though employer
allowed "swap-and-shop notices." Therefore, even with this leniency in the
employer's business-purpose only rule, as long as the employer banned all
organizational notices, there was no "disparate treatment" of the unions.5
The court further states that "the right of labor organization does not imply
that the employer must promote unions by giving them special access to
bulletin boards."5 9 If an employer designed its limiting rules to protect its
legitimate interests, then the rule is valid---"even where such rules and
regulations might have an ancillary effect of discouraging union
membership." 6° Thus, the next step is to prove that the employer has a
legitimate business interest for controlling e-mail use.

VII. LEGITIMATE EMPLOYER INTEREST
While employer rights may be pushed aside to allow the sharing of
information for employee organization,61 "the right to distribute is not
absolute, but must be accommodated to the circumstances." 62 Hence, a
restrictive, nondiscriminatory e-mail policy is legal if the employer is able63
to demonstrate that a restriction is "necessary to maintain... discipline.,
If the NLRB finds legitimate employer interests to support
nondiscriminatory restrictions of bulletin board use, which is much less
expensive and takes a small portion of the employer's property, the
employer should be able to have a nondiscriminatory business-use only
rule for e-mail for the same reasons and more. 4
56. Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
employer in this case discriminatorily applied its business-use only policy and allowed other
personal phone calls during work time but not calls in relation to the union).

57. See id. at 663.
58. Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1995).
59. Id. at318.
60. Union Carbide Corp., 714 F.3d at 664 (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,
460 U.S. 693,701 (1983)).
61. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Corp., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
62. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1992) (citation omitted).
63. Babcock & Wilson, 351 U.S at 110.

64. See Frank C. Morris, Jr., Issues from the Electronic Workplace E-Mail
Communications: The Developing Employment Law Nightmare, SB07 ALI-ABA 335, 346

(1996) (stating "[e]-mail impinges on the rights of employers even more so than
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Productivity is a prevalent employer interest that is disrupted with an
unlimited e-mail policy. E-mail can reach an employee at any time,
including work time. An employer compensates an employee for
effectively performing a service to further an employer's business. An
employer is not paying an employee to read union messages or any
nonwork related messages. "Working time is for work," 65 not for
organizing meetings of any sort-even for a local sports club. To allow
employees unlimited use of the employer's e-mail system invites abuse of
the employer/employee relationship to the detriment of the employer's
business goals.
The employer's property interests are also important. There should be
a balance of employer's property rights and employees organizing rights.
To allow an employer's property to be so counterproductive as to cost the
company a great loss is not taking into consideration an employer's rights.
While it is understandable that the Board wants to keep the lines of
communication open for self-organizing, Congress organized the NLRA to
keep the employer from discriminating against speech and organizational
efforts by "making them more costly than they would be if the employer
left the employees to their own devices." 66 Offering a medium that the
employees would otherwise only have access to with tremendous expense
on the union's part (setting up all members and possible members on email) does not comply with the purpose of the NLRA. As long as the
employer is not discriminating against union activities, it should be able to
control the tools it provides for its employees to participate in their jobs.
The Board also decided that preventing litter on the employer's
premises is a legitimate interest as well.61 While it might not be clear at
first, this interest is very pertinent in the e-mail context. Although one
cannot see the electronic litter that excessive e-mails cause, it still concerns
the employer. The employer has to worry about the disturbances and the
extra hours it takes to clean up this clutter. E-mail storage is not unlimited
and when e-mail messages overload electronic mailboxes, the e-mail
system does not work efficiently. If company e-mail is used for all
purposes, including union organizing, the employer is unable to predict the
support needs for the system. Wasted time and energy is then sapped into
distribution, because [e]-mail uses employer's hardware, time[,] and resources and
constantly interferes with work functions").
65. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943).
66. Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1995).
67. See United Parcel Serv., 327 N.L.R.B. No. 65 (Dec. 4, 1998) (stating "the employer
has a legitimate interest in keeping [a work area] free from litter"); Commercial Controls
Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1353 (1957) (stating "an employer has a legitimate interest in
keeping his plant clean and orderly").
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computer support staff, which could be limited if the system was kept
clean. Also, outside e-mails can carry viruses that can virtually wipe out
entire computer systems. The General Counsel agrees that e-mailing does
take up cyberspace and "has the potential to affect the performance of an
employer's computer network.""' Electronic litter takes a great deal of time
and money from the employer.
Clearly, the employer has substantial legitimate business interests that
should convince the NLRB that a nondiscriminatory, business-only e-mail
policy is valid. Without such a policy the employer is giving away its own
property to increase the union organizing efforts and decrease company
productivity. This is not the purpose of the NLRA.
VT[I. E-MAiL POLICY MUST BE STRICT
If an employer chooses to have a business-only e-mail policy, it must
be nondiscriminatory. This entails a hard line prohibition to any e-mail
other than business e-mails. Under no circumstances may the employer
permit any e-mail to be sent by an employee concerning a personal topic.
To do this would completely disrupt the property and productivity
protection the NLRA affords to the employer.
Despite the appearances of this strict rule, it is useful for the
employee and the employer. Obviously, the employer benefits because the
employer is assured employees will not abuse the company e-mail system
thereby decreasing property. The less obvious result is, however, that the
employer must be willing to forgo personal use of the company e-mail
system as well. If the employer chooses to limit its employees' use of email, the employer too must not use e-mail for nonbusiness purposes,
which essentially places the employer under the same restrictions as the
employee. Therefore, an employer will not make a business-only e-mail
policy unless the employer perceives that employee e-mail use issues
outweigh the convenience of employer personal use of the company e-mail
system. This places yet another check on employers to design e-mail
policies that do not discriminate against union organizing activity.
The strictness of the business-only e-mail policy also eases
enforcement issues for employers and the NLRB. By not allowing any
person to use e-mail for personal matters, the employer is able to set clear
guidelines for workers to follow. The Board is also able to clearly
adjudicate cases in which employees abuse e-mail policies or company email systems. Once the employer establishes that a business-only e-mail
policy is valid under its circumstances, the NLRB may limit its case to

68. Feinstein, supra note 31.
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analyzing the evidence demonstrating discriminatory use of e-mail or
violation of the employer's policy. Therefore, these policies will be
administered without tremendous litigation. In short, the hard-line approach
of a business-only e-mail policy will be beneficial.
IX. CONCLUSION
Labor organizing in cyberspace is not a subject that the NLRB
ignored. A case has yet to come before the Board. When one does, the
Board must be prepared. Its decision in this context will affect not only the
manner in which employees may organize, but also the way employers may
run their businesses and control their property. Due to the competing
important interests of the employee's right to organize and the employer's
property rights and rights to conduct a profitable business, it is necessary
for the NLRB to rule that e-mail in the labor context is distribution.
Therefore, use of company e-mail systems may be limited by a
nondiscriminatory, business-only e-mail policy if the employer has
legitimate business interests. To ensure that neither group needlessly
intrudes upon the other's rights, this ruling is necessary for both the
employer and employee.
This Note recommends that the weary employee or employer take
heed to the General Counsel Report for it is the only authority that directly
addresses the solicitation versus distribution issue. It is only one opinion of
many, however, and the Board must make a ruling on e-mail use in the
labor context. The Board's job is to make decisions according to the
NLRA, which traditionally entails recognizing the rights of employers to
nondiscriminatorily limit personal written communication from the work
area. A case will come before the NLRB soon, and this Note advocates that
the Board should decide that e-mail sent on company e-mail systems is
distribution. Until this decision is made, this Note can do no more than
repeat the warnings given by articles. Employers should: (1) have an e-mail
policy supported by legitimate employer interests; (2) make sure the policy
does not discriminate; (3) enforce the policy in a consistent,
nondiscriminatory manner; and (4) if an employer decides to follow
through with a business-only e-mail policy, be prepared to have the policy
challenged.

